This thesis addresses the surprising features of zero-temperature statics and dynamics of several spin glass models, including correlations between soft spins that arise spontaneously during avalanches, and the discovery of localized states that involve the presence of two-level systems. It also presents the only detailed historiographical research on the spin glass theory. Despite the extreme simplicity of their definition, spin glasses display a wide variety of non-trivial behaviors that are not yet fully understood. In this thesis the author sheds light (...) on some of these, focusing on both the search for phase transitions under perturbations of Hamiltonians and the zero-temperature properties and responses to external stimuli. After introducing spin glasses and useful concepts on phase transitions and numerics, the results of two massive Monte Carlo campaigns on three-dimensional systems are presented: The first of these examines the de Almeida-Thouless transition, and proposes a new finite-size scaling ansatz, which accelerates the convergence to the thermodynamic limit. The second reconstructs the phase diagram of the Heisenberg spin glass with random exchange anisotropy. (shrink)

: According to a traditional view, inferences are personal-level entities pertaining to the domain of reasons, and therefore they cannot be accounted for in causal terms – specifically, as mere associations. I intend to argue that this is at the very least a drastic simplification, for two reasons. First, the word “association” is polysemous, so we should specify in which of its possible senses an inference is not a mere association. Second, personal-level inferences based on formal rules are only the (...) extreme end of a complex developmental trajectory. As the last decades of research in the field have shown, we should refrain from identifying the entire domain of reasoning with that final stage, which is in fact mostly contingent upon extensive logical training. In this paper, I try to disentangle some major stages in the development of full-fledged inferences, and then to show that all of them – till the final one – can be considered associative in appropriate senses of the word. Keywords: Reasoning; Association; Consciousness; Inference; Development Un approccio associativo alle inferenze: l’evoluzione verso il prototipo Riassunto: Secondo una concezione tradizionale, le inferenze sono entità collocate al livello della persona e appartenenti al dominio delle ragioni, e pertanto non è possibile ridurle a un resoconto causale – più specificamente, a mere associazioni. Intendo sostenere che questa è quanto meno una drastica semplificazione, per due ragioni. Primo, la parola “associazione” è polisemica, quindi dovremmo precisare in quale senso un’inferenza non è una mera associazione. Secondo, inferenze al livello della persona e basate su regole formali sono solo il punto estremo di una complessa traiettoria di sviluppo. Come gli ultimi decenni di ricerca in questo campo hanno mostrato, dovremmo evitare di identificare l’intero dominio del ragionamento con questo stadio finale, che di fatto dipende da un esteso addestramento logico. In questo articolo, provo a discriminare alcuni stadi essenziali nello sviluppo delle inferenze in senso pieno, e quindi a mostrare che ciascuno di essi – incluso quello finale – possono essere considerati associativi in qualche opportuno senso della parola. Parole chiave: Ragionamento; Associazione; Coscienza; Inferenza; Sviluppo. (shrink)

Debates on situated affectivity have mainly focused on tools that exert some positive influence on affective experience. Far less attention has been paid to artifacts that interact with the expression of affect, or to those that exert some negative influence. To shed light on that shadowy corner of our affective social lives, I describe the workings of an atypical socio-affective artifact, namely, sunglasses. Drawing on insights from psychology and other social sciences, I construe sunglasses as a social shield that helps (...) us block spontaneous emotional expressions, as well as affecting other social processes that heavily depend on the eye region: gaze direction detection, identity recognition, and the sense of intimacy afforded by eye contact. (shrink)

resumo O propósito deste artigo é o de discutir em linhas gerais a relação entre método e me t a f í s ica na filosof ia de Descartes. Pre t e ndemos fazê-lo me d ia nte a cont raposição das Meditações de filosofia primeira às Regras para a direção do espírito quanto a alguns temas em comum. Nosso objetivo principal é questio nar o papel desempenhado pela evid ê nc ia intelectual no cont exto epistemo l ó g (...) ico das Regras e no cont exto metafísico das Meditações. Retoma ndo, num prime i ro mo me nto, algumas int e r p retações sobre o assunto e discutindo, num segundo momento, a natureza da dúvida e a noção de evidênc ia nas Meditações, pro c u ramos concluir com a sugestão de que no sistema cartesia no tem lugar um conflito de ordem estrutural entre método e metafísica.palavras-chave método; metafísica; evidência; dúvida; idéia; existência. (shrink)

Munch-Jurisic’s book thoroughly describes several cases of severe distresses reported and expressed by perpetrators of tremendous acts such as mass murders. Arguing against a simplistic reading according to which these signs of distress are straightforward manifestations of some innate moral nature, and against the optimistic reading according to which they will lead to prosocial behaviors, Munch-Jursic offers compelling reasons to adopt a more complex theory of emotion. In this commentary, I aim to stress the implications of her book for the (...) debate on moral enhancement and for emotion theory in general. However, while I concur with Munch-Jurisic that emotion theory must make room for complexity and indeterminacy, I challenge her claim that motivational theories of emotion are ill-equipped to face the challenges she poses. (shrink)

This paper attempts to show how the logical empiricists’ interpretation of the relation between geometry and reality emerges from a “collision” of mathematical traditions. Considering Riemann’s work as the initiator of a 19th century geometrical tradition, whose main protagonists were Helmholtz and Poincaré, the logical empiricists neglected the fact that Riemann’s revolutionary insight flourished instead in a non-geometrical tradition dominated by the works of Christoffel and Ricci-Curbastro roughly in the same years. I will argue that, in the attempt to interpret (...) general relativity as the last link of the chain Riemann–Helmholtz–Poincaré–Einstein, logical empiricists were led to argue that Einstein’s theory of gravitation mainly raised a problem of mathematical under-determination, i.e. the discovery that there are physical differences that cannot be expressed in the relevant mathematical structure of the theory. However, a historical reconstruction of the alternative Riemann–Christoffel–Ricci–Einstein line of evolution shows on the contrary that the main philosophical issue raised by Einstein’s theory was instead that of mathematical over-determination, i.e. the recognition of the presence of redundant mathematical differences that do not have any correspondence in physical reality. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

While philosophers tend to consider a single type of causal history, biologists distinguish between two kinds of causal history: evolutionary history and developmental history. This essay studies the peculiarity of development as a criterion for the individuation of biological traits and its relation to form, function, and evolution. By focusing on examples involving serial homologies and genetic reprogramming, we argue that morphology (form) and function, even when supplemented with evolutionary history, are sometimes insufficient to individuate traits. Developmental mechanisms bring in (...) a novel aspect to the business of classification—identity of process-type—according to which entities are type-identical across individuals and natural kinds in virtue of the fact that they form and develop through similar processes. These considerations bear important metaphysical implications and have potential applications in several areas of philosophy. (shrink)

In contemporary democracies, the image that political leaders project is of central importance to their electoral appeal, however, studies of image projection have mainly been based on textual messages, undermining often visual content such as photos, memes and postcards. This study explores populist leaders image projection through visuals on Facebook in a cross-national context, with the aim of verifying if politicians use images to promote their political action or if they instead implement more complex strategies of self-branding and personalisation. The (...) analysis focuses on the election campaign period for the 2019 European elections and proposes a comparison between four leaders that joined the European Parliament’s Group of Identity and Democracy, namely Matteo Salvini for Italy, Heinz-Christian Strache for Austria, Marine Le Pen for France and Alice Weidel for Germany. According to our analysis, important differences emerge in the use that leaders make of the images disseminated on Facebook. Some of them, in fact, disseminate almost exclusively images that are strictly related to their electoral campaign, while others seek a true identification with their voters, following the pattern of intimization. (shrink)

Our aim is to provide an account of constitutive rules in terms of (1) the acceptance of regulative norms, and (2) a cognitive process we call “symbolization” (in an altogether different sense from what J. R. Searle means by this word). We claim, first, that institutional facts à la Searle boil down to facts concerning the collective acceptance of regulative norms in a given community. This, however, does not exhaust what institutional facts are. There is a residue, symbolization. Symbolization, as (...) we understand it, involves a transfer of cognitive models from one domain to another. We introduce this notion by exploring different sorts of games, taking our cue from games of pretend play. In the context of this exploration, we introduce the idea of the significance—a matter of degree—of symbolization for a given institutional concept. In particular, we claim, symbolization may play, vis‐à‐vis a given institutional concept, a properly constitutive or a merely auxiliary role. We further argue that, in most legal concepts as conceived in our legal culture, symbolization plays a merely auxiliary role. A possible exception is the concept of political representation, at least on some understandings of it. (shrink)

The proposed peace treaty of 540 between Justinian and Vitiges ‒ according to most interpretations of Proc. Bell. Goth. 2.29.2 ‒ included a partition of Italy into two areas, one located south of the river Po and controlled by Justinian and the other located north of the Po and controlled by the Goths. However, a closer examination of Procopius’ wording and of similar passages indicates that Justinian aimed to receive only the tax revenues of southern and central Italy, with the (...) provinces themselves remaining in the hands of the Goths. (shrink)

In his Zur Einstein’schen Relativitätstheorie, Ernst Cassirer presents relativity theory as the last manifestation of the tradition of the “physics of principles” that, starting from the nineteenth century, has progressively prevailed over that of the “physics of models.” In particular, according to Cassirer, the relativity principle plays a role similar to the energy principle in previous physics. In this article, I argue that this comparison represents the core of Cassirer’s neo-Kantian interpretation of relativity. Cassirer pointed out that before and after (...) Kant, the history of physics presents significant instances in which the search for formal conditions that the laws of nature must satisfy preceded and made possible the direct search for such laws. In his earlier years, Cassirer seems to have regarded principles like the energy principle, the relativity principle, and the principle of least action as a constitutive but provisional form of a priori, imposing specific limitations on the form of the allowable laws of nature. Only in his later years, by attributing an autonomous status to these statements of principle, did Cassirer attribute a definitive but merely regulative meaning to the a priori. This does not impose specific requirements on natural laws but only a motivation to search for them. (shrink)

À proprement parler, la première « ontologie » de l’histoire fut publiée en 1606 par Jacob Lorhard, recteur du Gymnasium réformé de Saint-Gall. L’article examine l’ontologie de Lorhard en la replaçant dans son contexte suisse, celui d’une « municipalisation » de la théologie qui concerna aussi la métaphysique. Nous proposons d’abord une caractérisation « macrologique » de l’ontologie scolastique moderne par différence d’avec les voies différentes empruntées par les métaphysiques jésuites du xvi e siècle. Au niveau « micrologique » ensuite, (...) le cas de Saint-Gall permet de comparer les modèles métaphysiques des réformés et ceux des moines de l’Abbaye bénédictine. Les métaphysiques monastiques offrent de nouvelles perspectives à la recherche sur la naissance de l’ontologie à l’époque moderne. (shrink)

In two recent papers, Dan Sperber and Peter Carruthers have addressed the issue of cognitive flexibility, giving us different but somehow complementary accounts of it. Here I intend to focus on another cognitive mechanism which plays some role in allowing flexibility, and has been given little emphasis in their accounts. This mechanism is sensory imagination. In so doing, I have to confront with the assumption, which is widespread in the philosophical domain, that perceptual representations cannot convey any thought process. In (...) the first place, I argue that this assumption rests more on the notion of accessibility than on that of systematicity. In the second place, I argue that – as an argument from the frame problem seems to show – accessibility of propositional representation has been largely overestimated; besides, there are reasons to think that systematicity and accessibility of perceptual representations have been largely underestimated. Those arguments are held to support the conclusion that people, and nonhuman animals too, can make use of sensory imagination as a cognitive strategy to confront with novel state of affairs. This conclusion fits well with a large amount of research in comparative psychology, and converges with current models of controlled thought processes which are based on the notion of a mental global workspace. The differences with the accounts of Carruthers and Sperber are briefly investigated. (shrink)

The computer is one of the most complex artifacts ever built. Given its complexity, it can be described from many different points of view. The aim of this paper is to investigate the representational structure and multifunctionality of a particular subset of computers, namely personal devices from a user-centred perspective. The paper also discusses the concept of “cognitive task”, as recently employed in some definitions of cognitive artifacts, and investigates the metaphysical properties of such artifacts. From a representational point of (...) view, the article introduces the concepts of artifactual meta-representation and of semi-transparency, two features that personal devices share with some cognitive and non-cognitive artifacts. Recognising the meta-representational nature of personal devices and of other cognitive artifacts, thus overcoming semi-transparency, is important for the understanding of why different artifacts offer us different cognitive affordances as well as different cognitive advantages. In this sense, it is not simply a theoretical achievement, but has some important practical consequences. In our highly technological world we can use different kinds of computers and artifacts for solving the same tasks, and we need to understand why some artifacts are better suited for some tasks than others. The ultimate characterisation of personal devices that emerges from this work is that of a sort of super-artifact. This special status is given to personal devices because of their distinctive features. They are in fact intrinsically multifunctional and meta-representational artifacts, with extremely variable structures. As super-artifacts, personal devices are characterised by macro-functionality and can be easily used as both cognitive artifacts and tools for other functions, depending on the kind of representations they instantiate. (shrink)

(2013). Distributed intentionality: A model of intentional behavior in humans. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 267-290. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.641743.

In the philosophical and cognitive literature, the word ‘intention’ has been used with a variety of meanings which occasionally have been explicitly distinguished. I claim that an important cause of this polysemy is the fact that intentions are complex entities, endowed with an internal structure, and that sometimes different theories in the field are erroneously presented as if they were in conflict with each other, while they in fact just focus on different aspects of the phenomenon. The debate between Gallese’s (...) embodied simulation theory and Csibra and Gergely’s teleological stance hypothesis is discussed as a case in point, and some misunderstandings occurring in that debate are analyzed. The thesis that intentions are complex entities is argued for by shedding light on the following aspects of intentions: conscious control; perceptual (and not only motoric) representations of end-states; attributions of value to those representations; appreciation of the rational relationships between means and ends. (shrink)